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In May 2017, the Immigration Minister Peter Dutton 
announced that approximately 30,500 asylum seekers 
living in the Australian community had until 1 October 
2017 – a period of roughly four months – to lodge their full 
applications for asylum to the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection (DIBP). He said that any person who 
failed to lodge their application for asylum before the non-
negotiable deadline would be considered to have forfeited 
their asylum claim. As Minister Dutton put it, anyone who 
failed to file their asylum application by 1 October 2017 
would be ‘subject to removal from Australia, prohibited 
from applying for any Australian visa, cut from government 
income support and banned from re-entering Australia’.1  
This report demonstrates the manifest unfairness of the 
Minsterial deadline to apply for asylum for people subject 
to the Fast Track Assessment process and its ongoing 
dangerous consequences. It represents a key aspect in 
the ongoing punitive treatment of asylum seekers who, by 
the arbitrary nature of the dates of their arrival, happen to 
belong to what is called the ‘Legacy Caseload’. Specifically, 
this report shows that the imposition of the deadline is 
unfair and dangerous for five key reasons:
1. The imposition of the deadline was discriminatory in 
nature and constituted an arbitrary use of executive 
power. It only applied to people arriving in Australia by 
boat without authorisation between August 2012 and 
January 2014 and unfairly characterised this group of 
asylum seekers as illegitimate. 
2. The imposition of the deadline was unnecessary and 
unjustified. The Government’s claim that asylum 
seekers have ‘refused’ to apply for protection prior to 
the imposition of the deadline was inaccurate and 
misleading. Such a characterisation intentionally 
omitted details of a Government-imposed prohibition 
on certain asylum applications being made for a period 
of more than two years, which was only fully lifted for 
all affected asylum seekers at the end of 2016.
3. The operation of the arbitrary deadline denies some 
asylum seekers the ability to have their claims 
assessed at all. This directly breaches international 
human rights law and will endanger the lives of those 
seeking protection. 
4. The Government has denied asylum seekers forced to 
meet deadline the opportunity to present the fullest 
and most accurate version of their claim, as a result 
of the failure to provide the necessary legal and 
interpreting assistance.
5. The deadline further exacerbates the discriminatory 
effects of the Fast Track Assessment process, which 
subjects an arbitrarily-determined group of asylum 
seekers to a separate and inferior decision-making 
process. These asylum seekers will also have limited 
or no rights to appeal solely on the basis of their mode 
of arrival in Australia.
Critically, the enforcement of the deadline will have a severe 
impact on some of the most vulnerable members of the 
so-called ‘Legacy Caseload’: those who are not connected 
with support and legal services, who suffer from ongoing 
trauma or mental illness, or who, due to language and other 
barriers, have not been able to file a claim for protection. 
This report finds that the imposition and operation 
of the deadline breaches fundamental obligations 
owed by Australia under international law, including 
the prohibition on sending people back to places of 
persecution (the norm of non-refoulement), the right to 
equality before the law, and the right to a fair hearing.  
Firstly, the ‘lodge or leave’ terms of the deadline, such 
that those falling foul of it may be deported without any 
determination of their protection claim, breaches the 
most fundamental obligation owed by Australia under 
international refugee law: the prohibition on sending people 
back to places where they may face persecution. The entire 
Refugee Convention turns on respect for this principle. The 
deadline should not be enforced in this manner against any 
asylum seeker who did not file before 1 October 2017.
Secondly, the report finds that the legal issues and harms 
associated with the deadline are ongoing.  These harms 
will carry through to the assessment and determination 
of the asylum claims made by members of the Legacy 
Caseload. The effects of the deadline going forward will be 
exacerbated by the systemic deficiencies of the Fast Track 
Assessment process.  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Finally, this report concludes that there are grave concerns 
about the validity and correctness of any negative refugee 
status determination (RSD) decisions made under the Fast 
Track Assessment process. In particular, this process may 
be in breach of some of the most fundamental requirements 
for procedural fairness, including by denying people the right 
to a hearing.
This report strongly recommends that the Government 
must implement the following actions:
1. Allow all members of the Legacy Caseload to  
lodge an application for asylum. The deadline and  
its consequences must not be enforced against 
any asylum seeker who was unable to lodge their 
application by 1 October. 
2. Allow all members of this group to access full 
merits review of Departmental decisions before the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal and reinstate a 
single refugee status determination process. This is 
necessary to remove discrimination and ensure the fair 
processing of claims made by members of the Legacy 
Caseload. 
3. Ensure all asylum seekers have access to adequate 
resources and facilities to present their claims to 
protection, including providing Government-funded  
legal assistance and interpreting assistance.
4. Uphold Australia’s international legal obligations, 
including the prohibition on refoulement, and key 
international human rights principles as they apply  
to the refugee status determination process.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2017, the Immigration Minister Peter Dutton 
announced that approximately 30,500 asylum seekers 
living in the Australian community had until 1 October 
2017 – a period of roughly four months – to lodge their full 
applications for asylum to the Department of Immigration 
and Border Protection (DIBP), and that any person who 
failed to lodge before the non-negotiable deadline would 
be considered to have forfeited their claim. As Minister 
Dutton put it, anyone who failed to lodge their application 
by the 1 October deadline would be ‘subject to removal 
from Australia, prohibited from applying for any Australian 
visa, cut from government income support and banned 
from re-entering Australia’.2 As part of this announcement 
Minister Dutton stated that the ‘game is up’ for ‘fake 
refugees’, who were costing Australian tax payers ‘hundreds 
of millions of dollars a year’.3 Further, he announced that 
those who fail to meet the deadline would be immediately 
denied both income support and rental assistance, and only 
have access to Medicare and a right to work whilst making 
arrangements to depart.4  
In stating that any person who fails to lodge before 
the deadline will be considered to have forfeited their 
application, the Government has presented the failure to 
apply by 1 October 2017 as determinative of an applicant’s 
substantive claim to asylum. In the Government’s FAQ 
to asylum seekers who are affected by the deadline, the 
Department of Immigration and Border Protection sets out 
that:
If you do not lodge, you are not an asylum seeker and 
must return home. As you have had a considerable 
amount of time to apply, if you choose not to apply, 
you are not seeking protection in Australia.5 
The imposition of a non-negotiable, non-discretionary 
and blanket deadline to a cohort of asylum seekers – 
whereby the failure to meet the deadline extinguishes 
any form of claim – is an exceptionally unfair and 
dangerous measure. The operation of the deadline, such 
that those who fail to meet it are deemed to have forfeited 
their claim, breaches the most fundamental protection of 
the Refugee Convention: that no one who has a valid claim 
may be returned to a situation where they face serious 
harm.6 In order to uphold the principle of non-refoulement, 
all claims to asylum must be assessed by a competent 
authority. The imposition and operation of the deadline 
means that asylum seekers who have not met the deadline 
will be at risk of being sent to a place where they face 
persecution. Asylum seekers who managed to meet the 
deadline may have been compelled to submit applications 
without the benefit of legal assistance, or applications 
which were incomplete or incorrect. Not-for-profit refugee 
sector organisations urgently upscaled their operations to 
provide  legal help for the clients who otherwise had no 
access to Government-funded advice. Remarkably, these 
organsiations were able to advise their clients in the context 
of severe time and resource constraints, as addressed in 
Section VI. Challenges to filing an application on time for 
all applicants were compounded by limited or inadequate 
access to interpretation assistance. 
As a result, many asylum seekers affected by the deadline 
have been placed in the most invidious of positions: they 
were required to file asylum applications that either may 
not accurately reflect their claim (due to the limited legal 
resouces and interpreting support) or may not be the 
fullest and most accurate version of their claims. These 
applications may form the basis for a refusal of protection. 
Alternatively, asylum seekers who were not able to file their 
asylum applications by the deadline may be deemed to have 
forfeited the need for protection all together. 
The Government’s assertion that asylum seekers have 
‘refused’ to apply for protection is misleading. It intentionally 
omits details of the Government-imposed prohibition 
on applications, which was only fully lifted at the end of 
2016. This means that the deadline applies to a group of 
asylum seekers whom the Government, through the use of 
executive power, has systematically prohibited from lodging 
applications for protection. 
In responding to this deadline, refugee advocates and 
community legal centres have worked tirelessly to ensure 
their clients’ claims are filed and raised money to increase 
their capacity to assist their clients. The Government’s 
deadline was announced in spite of the fact that the 
majority of the asylum seekers affected no longer have 
access to Government-funded legal assistance; that 
many of them were known to be on waiting lists for legal 
assistance; and in spite of the Government’s knowledge 
that existing community legal services are at, or beyond, 
capacity. Critically, the deadline will have a severe impact 
on some of the most vulnerable members of the so-
called ‘Legacy Caseload’: those who are not connected 
with support and legal services, who suffer from ongoing 
trauma or mental illness, or who, due to language and other 
barriers, have not been able to file a claim for protection. 
The deadline thus represents a key aspect in the ongoing 
punitive treatment of asylum seekers in Australia, who 
happen to belong to the Legacy Caseload as a result of the 
arbitrary dates and mode of their arrival. 
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II. TO WHOM DID THE  
 DEADLINE APPLY?
As a matter of policy, the deadline applied to asylum 
seekers who arrived by boat without a valid visa on or after 
13 August 2012 but before 1 January 2014, and were not 
transferred to Nauru or Papua New Guinea under Australia’s 
offshore processing arrangements.7 These asylum seekers 
are also categorised as ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ 
or UMAs and are subject to the Fast Track Assessment 
process under the Migration Act.8 The Government has 
asserted that in creating the additional category of ‘fast 
track applicant’, its aim was to ‘include non-citizens who 
arrived in Australia unauthorised, circumventing regular, 
lawful migration channels.’9 
Asylum seekers subject to this definition comprise the 
so-called ‘Legacy Caseload’. This group of people are 
described by the Coalition Government as representing 
‘Labor’s backlog’ of asylum seekers who arrived by boat and 
who were not sent to Nauru or Papua New Guinea.10  The 
term ‘Labor’s backlog’, though, is inaccurate. The arbitrary, 
stipulated timeframe includes those arriving by boat after 
Coalition Government was formed in September 2013.11 In 
announcing the deadline itself, Minister Dutton nonetheless 
characterised the group as consisting of asylum seekers 
who came to Australia ‘when Labor lost control of our 
borders’.12  The discriminatory treatment of this group of 
asylum seekers has been the basis of a number of policy 
initiatives since at least 2012, including under Labor’s No 
Advantage policy. 
Approximately 30,500 asylum seekers form part of this 
Legacy Caseload. This group consists of people from a 
range of countries including Iran (32%), Sri Lanka (19%), 
and Afghanistan (13%). It also includes approximately 2,500 
people who are considered stateless, many of which are 
likely to be Rohingya people fleeing persecution in Myanmar 
(Burma).13  Afghanistan and Myanmar in particular are 
considered to be ‘major source countries of refugees’ by the 
UNHCR.14  
At the time of the  announcement of the deadline in May 
2017, approximately 7,500 people were yet to apply for 
asylum and 23,000 asylum seekers had already lodged their 
claims.15  Four days before the deadline fell, the Government 
reported that 531 people had not yet applied for a visa.16 
On 12 October 2017, Minister Dutton stated that 71 people 
within the Legacy Caseload had not submitted their asylum 
applications by the deadline and that these people would 
be automatically cut off from receiving income support. The 
DIBP website now advises asylum seekers who were subject 
to the deadline that if they did not lodge an application by 
the deadline, they are ‘expected to depart Australia’ and 
are ‘barred from applying for any type of visa in Australia’. 
Otherwise, it states, ‘you risk detention and removal from 
Australia’.17
Many of these asylum seekers have been living in the 
community, albeit without a secure status, for up to five 
years. They have managed to make a home in Australia and 
are part of their local communities.
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A key justification of the deadline was that affected asylum 
seekers had been given ‘significant opportunity to lodge 
an application’ for asylum and had failed or refused to do 
so.18 In presenting affected asylum seekers as having had 
‘significant opportunity’ to apply for asylum since their 
arrival, the Government omitted a key part of this story. 
For much of the period in question, asylum seekers 
belonging to the Legacy Caseload were subject to a 
Government-imposed statutory restriction, which prohibited 
them from filing an application for protection under any 
circumstances. Asylum seekers subject to the statutory 
prohibition waited for extended periods to be allowed 
to lodge an application. For some affected individuals, this 
included waiting for up to 4 years to be permitted to apply 
for asylum. The Government prevented some applicants 
from filing their applications until late 2016, mere months 
before the deadline was announced. 
In order to lodge an application for asylum, those defined 
as UMAs under the Migration Act were required to wait 
until the Minister personally lifted a statutory bar and 
provided individual applicants with written permission to 
apply for a visa.19 This permission could only be granted 
at the Minister’s discretion. After the Minister decided to 
‘lift the bar’ for an individual, the Minister then informed 
that individual via letter that they were ‘invited’ to apply 
for either a Temporary Protection Visa (TPV) or a Safe 
Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV). They could not apply for any 
other visa. The letter stated that the asylum seeker was 
‘requested’ to lodge their completed application within 28 
days of the date that they are assumed to have received 
the letter.20 In practice, asylum seekers did not require an 
extension from the Department of this timeframe if they 
submitted their application within 60 days, and applications 
submitted beyond this time were still deemed to be valid. 
Many applicants were not invited to apply before 
2016, which means that members of the Legacy 
Caseload have been directly prevented from filing 
their applications by successive Labor and Coalition 
Immigration Ministers. Indeed, these asylum seekers were 
initially prevented from lodging their claims from August 
2012 under the Labor Government’s ‘No Advantage’ policy, 
which sought to ensure that onshore maritime arrivals were 
not advantaged over those asylum seekers who had not 
sought to arrive in Australia by boat. As the Refugee Council 
of Australia has documented:
Most asylum seekers who came to Australia by boat 
after 13 August 2012 waited for well over three years 
for the opportunity to lodge a protection application. 
This is because from August 2012 until the year 2015, 
refugee status determination (RSD) was suspended 
for this group.21
 
Following the initial three year suspension from 2012 of all 
refugee status determinations for the group to whom the 
deadline applies, the Government did begin ‘lifting the bar’ 
and allowing applications in July 2015. By February 2016, 
the Minister had lifted the bar for 12,155 people, though only 
8,105 of these people had been sent the required ‘invitation-
to-apply’ letters.22  The Department did not finish ‘lifting the 
bar’ for all people in the Legacy Caseload group until late 
2016.23  
The imposition of the 1 October 2017 deadline in May 2017 
changed this practice of lodging applications for asylum, 
and required all applications to be lodged by the deadline. 
However, affected asylum seekers were not given access 
to Government -funded legal and interpreting assistance 
that could have enabled them to meet the pressing new 
deadline. In fact, in recent years the Government has 
actively abolished funding to lawyers and community 
legal centres assisting asylum seekers who have arrived 
in Australia by boat. As will be demonstrated in Section VI 
of this report, this has made it a near-impossible task for 
asylum seekers to meet the requirements of this arbitrary 
change in Government policy. 
III. SIGNIFICANT PRIOR  
 OPPORTUNITY TO LODGE  
 AN APPLICATION? 
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Australian law recognises that in order for a decision to 
be fair and correct, a person must be afforded certain 
procedural rights. This is called procedural fairness or 
‘natural justice’. Procedural fairness is concerned with the 
quality of the process through which decisions are made. 
The rules of procedural fairness seek to guarantee fairness 
and impartiality in government action and to ensure that 
people are able to ‘participate in the making of decisions 
that affect them’.24 Ensuring the correctness of a decision 
is all the more important in the case of asylum seekers, 
where the stakes are high and the consequences of an 
inaccurate decision involve sending a person back to a place 
of persecution.
The UNHCR sets out that ‘fair and efficient procedures are 
an essential element in the full and inclusive application of 
the [Refugee] Convention’.25 Principles, rules or standards 
governing the structure or process of refugee status 
determination (RSD) are absent from the 1951 Refugees 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol.26 However, in order 
to implement and apply the Refugees Convention’s core 
provisions, each state must have a mechanism to determine 
refugee status. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures 
and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status is the key 
international source of guidance on RSD procedure, and on 
the minimum standards under international refugee law for 
assessing refugee claims. 
Recognising that RSD procedures will vary significantly 
from state to state, the UNHCR Handbook stipulates the 
‘basic requirements’, which each signatory state’s refugee 
status determination procedures must meet to ensure fair 
process and outcomes.27 A number of these requirements 
are relevant to the imposition of the deadline, including: 
•  That an applicant’s claim is assessed by a competent 
official who is required to act in accordance with the 
relevant international law and the principle of non-
refoulement; 
•  That there is a clearly identified, and where possible, 
central authority with responsibility for determining 
refugee status in the first instance; 
•  That the applicant receives ‘the necessary guidance as 
to the procedure to be followed’ and the applicant be 
given ‘necessary facilities’ including access to interpreting 
services, to submit his/her case to the authorities; and
•  That unsuccessful applicants should be given the 
opportunity to appeal in accordance with the prevailing 
system.28 
IV. PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS:  
 THE BARE MINIMUMS
These requirements are to be interpreted as minimum 
standards. They preserve an extremely broad and open 
discretion for state signatories to the Convention and do not 
enshrine strict or high standards of procedural fairness. As 
outlined in the next section, the process and the deadline 
that applies to the ‘Legacy Caseload’ breached even these 
minimum standards. 
Australian law enshrines the right to procedural fairness 
in relation to government action and decision-making at a 
high standard. As Matthew Groves explains in regards to 
Australian domestic law:
[t]he scope of the duty to observe the requirements 
of procedural fairness is now extremely wide. It is 
well-settled that the duty extends to virtually every 
exercise of a statutory power which might have an 
adverse effect on an individual unless there is a very 
clear legislative indication to the contrary.29 
In the case of Australia, the right to procedural fairness 
attaches to any decision where an individual’s ‘rights, 
interests or legitimate expectations’ are affected and 
there is no express statutory intention to exclude the right 
to a procedurally fair determination.30 The Australian 
standard requires that the applicant is afforded a fair 
hearing, and that that hearing is not affected by actual or 
apprehended bias.31 What a fair hearing requires depends 
on the statutory context and nature of decision, but an 
applicant must have adequate notice that the decision 
is going to be made; disclosure of the case against her 
or him; and the opportunity to present her or his case.32  
Although there is flexibility as to what fairness will require 
in any circumstances, fundamentally the law requires the 
avoidance of practical injustice. As Gleeson CJ noted in Re 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs, Ex Parte Lam:
Fairness is not an abstract concept. It is essentially 
practical. Whether one talks in terms of procedural 
fairness or natural justice, the concern of the law is 
to avoid practical injustice.33  
As the next section outlines, the ‘practical injustice’ of the 
deadline is the extent to which it removes the opportunity 
to present a case for those who did not meet the deadline; 
and for those who did meet the deadline, its negative effect 
on an asylum-seeker’s ability to present her or his case, 
and therefore the opportunity to have his or her claim fairly 
assessed under the Fast Track Assessment process.
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The serious injustice produced by the deadline is two-fold. 
Firstly, the finality of the deadline means that certain 
asylum seekers may be denied any form of refugee status 
determination and potentially returned to a country of origin 
in breach of the Refugees Convention guarantee of non-
return to circumstances of danger or harm. Secondly, those 
who applied in compliance with the deadline may have done 
so in circumstances that did not afford them procedural 
fairness. They may not have been  guaranteed the bare 
minimum, international law standard of ‘guidance as to the 
procedure to be followed’ since asylum seekers affected by 
the deadline may not have been guaranteed legal or other 
V. THE PROCEDURAL  
 UNFAIRNESS OF THE  
 DEADLINE
necessary assistance to understand the process,  
adequate access to interpreting services, or sufficient  
time to present their claim in full to their legal advisers  
or in their application. 
These issues are severely compounded by the fact  
that these asylum seekers are subject to the ‘Fast Track 
Assessment Process’. The problems associated with the 
Fast Track Assessment process and how this process 
interacts with the October deadline are outlined in Sections 
VII and VIII. 
UNHCR ON TIME LIMITS FOR APPLICATIONS
“A fundamental safeguard in some systems, which should, in UNHCR’s view, be promoted for all, is the recognition 
that an asylum-seeker’s failure to submit a request within a certain time limit or the non-fulfilment of other formal 
requirements should not in itself lead to an asylum request being excluded from consideration, although under 
certain circumstances a late application can affect its credibility. The automatic and mechanical application of time 
limits for submitting applications has been found to be at variance with international protection principles.” 34
 “Formal requirements should not pose an obstacle to the exercise of the right to seek asylum. In particular, an 
applicant’s failure to submit an asylum claim within a certain time-limit should not of itself lead to the claim 
being excluded from consideration. Legislation which does not impose time-limits for the submission of asylum 
applications, as is the case in Japan, is clearly best practice.” 35
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VI. RESOURCES AND  
 PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
International law provides that all people ‘shall be equal 
before the courts and tribunals’.36  The UN Human Rights 
Council has held that this obliges states to ensure that 
individuals have ‘equal access and equality of arms, and 
ensures that the parties to the proceedings in question are 
treated without any discrimination’.37  For example, the  
Inter-American Commission for Human Rights has 
recognised that states are required to provide additional 
measures to ensure an individual has ‘due process before 
the law’.38 This guarantee is particularly important in the 
case of undocumented migrants and asylum seekers, who 
may have a limited knowledge of English and few financial 
resources. The following section examines two measures 
of particular importance to ensuing equal access and due 
process before the law: the provision of legal assistance and 
provision of interpreting assistance.
Access to Legal Assistance:
International law expressly recognises the relationship 
between the right to equality before the law and the 
provision of legal representation and assistance, particularly 
in the context of a criminal trial.39 The UN Human Rights 
Council has noted that the ‘availability or absence of legal 
assistance often determines whether or not a person can 
access the relevant proceedings or participate in them 
in a meaningful way’.40 States are thus encouraged – and 
at times obliged – to provide free legal assistance for 
individuals in non-criminal trials without ‘sufficient means  
to pay for it’ themselves.
The UNHCR has emphasised the importance of access  
to free legal assistance in the case of asylum seekers:
Asylum-seekers are often unable to articulate the 
elements relevant to an asylum claim without the 
assistance of a qualified counselor because they 
are not familiar with the precise grounds for the 
recognition of refugee status and the legal system 
of a foreign country. Quality legal assistance and 
representation is, moreover, in the interest of States, 
as it can help to ensure that international protection 
needs are properly identified. The efficiency of 
first instance procedures is thereby improved. In 
UNHCR’s view, the right to legal assistance 
and representation is an essential safeguard, 
especially in complex asylum procedures. It is 
also important to guarantee free legal assistance 
and representation in first instance procedures 
and against negative decisions.41
Limited or no government-funded legal assistance has been 
made available to asylum seekers affected by the deadline 
to assist them in making their claims and completing, at a 
minimum, the 33 page form (Form 866) required to apply 
for either a TPV or SHEV. In practice, the final written 
application is much longer than 33 pages and also requires 
the applicant to make a separate, detailed statement.  
The Department informed asylum seekers affected by the 
deadline that they were entitled to engage the services of 
a registered migration agent but that applicants ‘will have 
to pay for this yourself’.42 Only a small portion of asylum 
seekers are eligible to receive legal assistance under the 
government-funded scheme, the Primary Application 
Information Service (PAIS). In order to qualify, an asylum 
seeker must be either an unaccompanied minor or a person 
deemed by the Department to be ‘exceptionally vulnerable’. 
Only a little over one-tenth - approximately 3,500 people 
out of the total 30,500 – of asylum seekers affected by the 
deadline were offered legal assistance  funded through the 
PAIS between 2015 and March 2017.43  This PAIS assistance 
is not available for appeals of an original decision to the 
Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA).
This lack of government-funded legal assistance has 
meant that the majority – almost nine-tenths – of asylum 
seekers affected by the deadline had to rely upon the free 
legal services offered by community legal centres. These 
legal centres receive no funding from the Commonwealth 
Government for assisting asylum seekers, except for the 
small portion of asylum seekers funded under the PAIS.44 
Instead, these centres operate largely through philanthropic 
donations and mobilising volunteers, including lawyers 
offering pro bono services. Due to such finite resources, 
community legal centres can only assist a limited number 
of asylum seekers at any given time. This resulted in long 
waiting lists of asylum seekers affected by the deadline 
requesting advice from community legal centres. For 
example, in October 2016, RACS estimated that it had 
a 12-month wait list for clients wanting to access their 
service.45 
Peak community legal centres offering free legal assistance 
to asylum seekers affected by the deadline have expressed 
serious and ongoing concerns about their ability to meet the 
unprecedented demand for their services. 
At the time of the Minister Dutton’s announcement of 
the 1 October 2017 deadline, many of the approximately 
7,500 asylum seekers yet to file their applications seeking 
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asylum were on waiting lists for legal assistance from 
community legal centres. This fact further demonstrates 
the inaccuracy of Minister Dutton’s characterisation of 
these asylum seekers as ‘refusing’ to submit their claims 
up until that time. Moreover, the government has dismissed 
concerns about the lack of available legal assistance on two 
bases: first, the remaining asylum seekers do not require 
legal assistance to lodge their claims; and second, that the 
government has provided Protection Application Information 
and Guides in multiple languages on their website. Such a 
response is unsatisfactory and demonstrates a disregard for 
the minimum standards stipulated by the UNHCR.    
The unfairness of the lack of government-funded legal 
assistance is compounded by the non-discretionary 
operation of the deadline. The Government announcement 
and official FAQs for applicants made clear that an inability 
to access legal assistance did not constitute grounds 
for an extension of the deadline. Under the headings ‘My 
migration agent has said they will not be able to help me 
until after 1 October’ and ‘I can’t get to a pro-bono (free) 
migration agent’, the DIBP FAQ document stated that 
‘There are no grounds to provide an extension’ and ‘You 
must still lodge before 1 October 2017’.46  The imposition 
of a non-discretionary deadline makes it highly likely that 
some asylum seekers simply were not able to access legal 
assistance prior to submitting their claims. This is in addition 
to the 71 asylum seekers who did not submit a claim before 
1 October 2017.47  
     UNHCR ON LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
At all stages of the procedure, including at the 
admissibility stage, asylum-seekers should receive 
guidance and advice on the procedure and have 
access to legal counsel. Where free legal aid is 
available, asylum-seekers should have access to  
it in case of need.48 
Interpreting Assistance:
It is clear that the above UNHCR Guidelines provide that 
an applicant should be given ‘necessary facilities’ including 
access to interpreting services, to submit his/her case to 
the authorities. The UNHCR’s Procedural Standards for 
Refugee Status Determination under UNHCR’s Mandate 
also state that an asylum seeker ‘should have access to the 
services of trained and qualified interpreters at all stages 
of the RSD process’.49 This minimum standard reflects the 
importance of ensuring that a person’s claim is translated in 
an accurate, professional and impartial manner.
 
Interpreting assistance is essential to guaranteeing a 
person’s right to be heard and to equal access to a court. 
The UN Human Rights Council has recognised that ensuring 
an individual’s right to equal access to a court, as enshrined 
in article 14 of the ICCPR, may in exceptional circumstances 
require states to provide the free assistance of an 
interpreter to ‘an indigent party who could not participate 
in the proceedings on equal terms’. Without interpreting 
services, it can be difficult for asylum seekers who may have 
with limited or no knowledge of English to ensure that their 
written claim is a factually accurate version of their claim to 
asylum. Access to free professional interpreting assistance 
thus provides a foundation for a fair hearing and affects the 
quality of the final decision.
Asylum seekers subject to the Fast Track Assessment 
process and deadline are required to complete their claims 
in English and provide certified English translations of 
any documents in support of their claims.50  If they fail to 
complete their applications in English, the application will 
be invalid. While asylum seekers who are subject to the 
deadline were told that they may engage the services of a 
translator to assist them in completing their applications, 
the government initially did not provide them with any free 
interpreting assistance. 
Presently, the Australian government Translating and 
Interpreting Service (TIS) offers fee-for-service assistance 
for people who do not speak English and charges $110 for 
one hour of standard telephone interpreting.51  This cost 
is prohibitive for asylum seekers with limited financial 
resources, who were affected by the deadline and were 
not granted adequate interpreting assistance. As a result, 
the imposition to the 1 October 2017 deadline has 
meant that these asylum seekers may not have been 
able to complete the required forms at all; or may have 
submitted applications that are incomplete, incorrect or 
do not provide a clear or full account of their claims to 
protection.
13
VII. WHAT IS THE FAST TRACK  
 ASSESSMENT PROCESS?
The Fast Track Assessment process was first introduced 
in Australia by the Coalition government in December 
2014.52  It permits the Minister of Immigration to allow an 
asylum seeker to apply for one of two temporary protection 
visas if the Minister thinks it is in the ‘public interest’ to do 
so.53 These visas are either a Temporary Protection Visa 
(TPV) (class 866) or a Safe Haven Enterprise Visa (SHEV) 
(class 790). To apply for either a TPV or a SHEV, an asylum 
seeker must lodge an application that comprises of a 
minimum of 33 pages, including 184 questions, alongside 
the requirement of a detailed written statement, which is 
the basis for assessing each asylum seeker’s claim.54  The 
Fast Track Assessment process created a new, separate 
and inferior decision-making process for asylum seekers 
who arrived without authorisation by boat. For most people 
subject to the Fast Track Assessment process, this process 
consists of an initial decision by the Department, which, if 
negative, may be reviewed by a newly-created authority, 
the Immigration Assessment Authority (IAA), which sits 
within the Australian Administrative Tribunal (AAT). Yet, 
unlike the AAT, the IAA only conducts ‘on the papers’ merits 
review, meaning that a person will not be called for another 
interview or present his or her claim in person. The IAA also 
has less independence than other divisions in the AAT, as 
IAA members are appointed as public servants rather than 
as statutory decision-makers and are thus at greater risk of 
political interference.55  
Asylum seekers subject to the Fast Track Assessment 
process do not have an automatic right to review by the 
IAA. It is the Department that determines and automatically 
refers applications for review to the IAA. Some people 
– deemed ‘excluded fast track review applicants’ – are 
prohibited from having their case reviewed by the IAA. This 
includes cases where, for example, the Department has 
decided that a person’s claim is ‘manifestly unfounded’ 
or that they relied on ‘bogus documents’ in their original 
claim.56 In addition, the Minister has unprecedented power 
to intervene in the process and to ‘correct’ a decision of 
the Department if the Minister deems the original decision 
to be ‘contrary to the national interests’. These Ministerial 
decisions, issued as a ‘conclusive certificate’, are not subject 
to review.57 Under the Fast Track Assessment process, 
then, it is possible for a person’s future to rest entirely 
with a single decision-maker.58 As this report illustrates, 
the exercise of such a high degree of non-reviewable 
power, especially for applicants affected by the deadline, is 
dangerous and unfair.
International human rights law does not permit policies 
that are deliberately discriminatory either in their nature 
or in their effect. The Fast Track Application process 
is discriminatory in that it subjects a select group of 
asylum seekers to an expedited and inferior decision-
making process with limited review, purely on the basis 
of their mode of arrival in Australia.59 It also operates 
retrospectively, applying to people who arrived in Australia 
prior to the establishment of the Fast Track Application 
process itself. 
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In explaining the rationale for the introduction of the Fast 
Track Assessment process reforms, then Immigration 
Minister Scott Morrison stated:
The government is of the view that a ‘one size fits all’ 
approach to responding to the spectrum of asylum 
claims made under Australia’s protection framework 
is inconsistent with a robust protection system 
that promotes efficiency and integrity. It limits the 
government’s capacity to address and remove 
those found to have unmeritorious claims quickly 
… The government has no truck with people who 
want to game the system. A new approach is 
warranted in the Australian context. The fast-track 
assessment process … will efficiently and effectively 
respond to unmeritorious claims for asylum and will 
replace access to the Refugee Review Tribunal with 
access to a new model of review, the Immigration 
Assessment Authority—to be known as the IAA.60
Yet, around the time of the introduction of the Fast Track 
Assessment process, the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Human Rights noted that while ‘administratively efficient 
processes are generally desirable, it is unclear whether the 
… fast track process will ensure that genuine claims for 
protection are identified and, in the case of the fast-track 
review process, that it is capable of ensuring that the true 
and correct decision is arrived at’. 61 This is of particular 
concern given that an expedited process with only limited 
avenues for review heightens the risk of Australia returning 
a person to a place of persecution and the ‘irreversible 
nature of the harm that may result’.62 
Under all asylum decision-making processes, the accuracy 
and detail in original applications are of great importance, 
since each refugee’s claim is judged against the criteria 
of consistency and consistency is tested against the 
applicant’s original claim and any new or additional claims  
submitted by an applicant on review. Under the Fast 
Track Assessment process, there is significantly more 
pressure on applicants to articulate the fullest and most 
accurate version of the claim in the first instance, since 
applicants no longer have access to full merits review 
of the Department’s original decision. New information 
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or additional details in a claim cannot be admitted to the 
IAA unless there are exceptional circumstances, and the 
IAA is satisfied that the new information was not known 
to the applicant or could not have been provided to the 
Department at the time of the applicant’s original hearing.63  
In heightening the pressure on asylum seekers to complete 
their applications by the 1 October 2017 at all costs, the 
imposition of the 1 October 2017 deadline on asylum 
seekers subject to the Fast Track Application process may 
exacerbate the discriminatory effects of the IAA’s inferior 
review mechanisms when compared with the usual asylum 
decision-making review process conducted by the AAT. 
In practice, the IAA has overwhelmingly affirmed 
Departmental decisions. As of 31 July 2017, the IAA had 
made 1,604 decisions, 82% of which affirmed the initial 
decision. In comparison, approximately 51% of decisions by 
the former MRT/RRT of non-fast track applicant decisions 
were affirmed.64 This significant difference indicates that 
the different nature of the two decision-making processes 
substantially affects the outcome of decisions. In practice, 
a less robust merits review process is likely to give rise 
to applicants seeking increased judicial review in superior 
courts. This has been the case in the UK and has actually 
increased the length and cost of legal processes, rather 
than making them more efficient. 
These statistics confirm earlier concerns of legal experts 
that the IAA process is ‘dangerous, unnecessary and 
undesirable’.65 As an ANU Migration Law Program Senate 
Submission notes, the ‘diminution and/or removal of 
merits review processes … increases the risk of inaccurate 
decision-making in relation to the protection claims of 
“asylum legacy caseload” applicants, and thereby increases 
the potential for the refoulement of refugees to a place 
of persecution’.66 One key limitation of the IAA ‘on the 
paper’ process is that it prevents a decision-maker from 
re-examining a person’s credibility and thus the IAA defers 
heavily to negative credibility assessments made by the 
Department. This strong deference to the Department 
impinges upon the independence of the IAA review process 
and significantly increases the likelihood of errors in 
decision-making.
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The Government’s justification for these changes is that 
the new process will ‘discourage asylum seekers who 
attempt to exploit the current review process by presenting 
manufactured claims’.67  Instead, the denial of merits review 
for so-called ‘excluded fast track review applicants’ and 
the very limited review process for non-excluded fast track 
applicants has created a process that excessively prioritises 
efficiency over the correctness and fairness of decision-
making. The Fast Track Assessment process has diminished 
the legitimate scrutiny of government decision-making, 
resulting in limited accountability of executive power and 
increasing the risk of returning refugees to places where 
they face persecution. 
SNAPSHOT OF IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY DECISIONS (2016 – 2017)
In 2016-2017, 87% of IAA decisions concerned people seeking asylum from one of four countries of origin: 
Sri Lanka (50%), Iran (18%), Afghanistan (10%) and Iraq (9%). Within this cohort, applicants from Iran has the 
highest likelihood of having their decisions remitted by the IAA to the Department for reconsideration (with 31% 
of applicants having their decision favourably reviewed), while applicants from Sri Lanka had the lowest chance 
of having their decisions reviewed in their favour (with only 11% of decisions remitted). For applicants from 
Afghanistan and Iraq (with a 24% or 23% chance respectively of a favourable review decision), the IAA affirmed that 
three out of every four applicants were not refugees and that they did invoke Australia’s complementary protection 
obligations under international law. In effect, this meant that 247 people from Iraq and Afghanistan were liable for 
deportation back to countries where they claimed to be at risk of harm.  
For example, in a 2017 IAA decision, the IAA decision-maker accepted that it was unsafe for a Hazara man to 
return to his home region in the Jaghori District in Ghazni Province, as it was one of ‘the most volatile provinces 
in Afghanistan in terms of attacks on defence forces, international forces and civilians, due to the activities of the 
Taliban and other insurgent groups present in Pashtun majority districts’. Nonetheless, the IAA decision-maker 
held that the Hazara man was not a refugee as he could relocate instead to Kabul, the capital city currently mostly 
under government control. While the decision-maker accepted that attacks from the Taliban still did occur in 
Kabul, the decision-maker stated that these had become ‘infrequent’.68  In another similar negative decision, the IAA 
decision-maker found that a Hazara man from Afghanistan could take ‘reasonable steps to modify his behaviour’, 
such as giving up his past profession of a driver, as a way of reducing his risk of harm.69 
The IAA, like the Migration and Refugee Division of the AAT, does not publicly release all of its decisions.70 This 
makes it difficult to scrutinise the IAA’s reasoning in affirming Departmental decisions. Some IAA decisions have 
been subject to judicial review by superior courts, most commonly the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA). 
The overwhelming majority of these appeals do not succeed, as it can be difficult to establish that a requisite error 
of law occurred.71  
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IX. ONGOING HARMS
This report finds that the imposition and operation 
of the deadline breaches fundamental obligations 
owed by Australia under international law, including 
the prohibition on sending people back to places of 
persecution (the norm of non-refoulement), the right to 
equality before the law, and the right to a fair hearing.  
Firstly, the ‘lodge or leave’ terms of the deadline, such 
that those falling foul of it may be deported without any 
determination of their protection claim, breaches the 
most fundamental obligation owed by Australia under 
international refugee law: the prohibition on sending people 
back to places where they may face persecution. The entire 
Refugee Convention turns on respect for this principle. The 
deadline should not be enforced in this manner against any 
asylum seeker who did not file before 1 October 2017.
Secondly, the report finds that the legal issues and harms 
associated with the deadline are ongoing.  These harms 
will carry through to the assessment and determination 
of the asylum claims made by members of the Legacy 
Caseload. The effects of the deadline going forward will be 
exacerbated by the systemic deficiencies of the Fast Track 
Assessment process.  
Finally, this report concludes that there are grave concerns 
about the validity and correctness of any negative refugee 
status determination (RSD) decisions made under the 
Fast Track Assessment process. In particular, this process 
may be in breach of some of the most fundamental 
requirements for procedural fairness, including by denying 
people the right to a hearing.
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X. RECOMMENDATIONS
This report strongly recommends that the Government 
must implement the following actions:
1. Allow all members of the Legacy Caseload to 
lodge an application for asylum. The deadline and 
its consequences must not be enforced against 
any asylum seeker who was unable to lodge their 
application by 1 October. 
2. Allow all members of this group to access full 
merits review of Departmental decisions before the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal and reinstate a 
single refugee status determination process. This is 
necessary to remove discrimination and ensure the 
fair processing of claims made by members of the 
Legacy Caseload. 
3. Ensure all asylum seekers have access to adequate 
resources and facilities to present their claims to 
protection, including providing Government-funded 
legal assistance and interpreting assistance.
4. Uphold Australia’s international legal obligations, 
including the prohibition on refoulement, and key 
international human rights principles as they apply to 
the refugee status determination process.
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